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1. Introduction 
 
This policy brief examines the phenomenon of “energy islands” in the EU, namely – Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltic Sea region and Spain and Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula, 
analysing the causes, outstanding issues and implications of the current situation for future 
development of EU energy policy and energy policy in the countries concerned.  Development of 
strategic energy infrastructure, involvement of energy companies, as well as putting in place 
legislation that would provide a framework for effectively functioning market, increased energy 
cooperation and energy security in the EU are among the issues covered. 
 
For a long time Europe has faced an intractable energy infrastructure interconnection problem. 
Interconnections are essential for energy security both logistically and politically, yet Europe 
remains dotted with energy islands: places with a complete lack of electricity and gas 
interconnections. There can be no effectively functioning common free European energy market 
if there are no wires and pipelines in place. A lack of interconnecting infrastructure cripples 
European energy security precluding the ability to supply energy and energy resources to regions 
that might potentially be affected by conscious politically motivated adverse supply policies by 
suppliers. Such a situation also precludes the ability to effectively feed renewable energy into the 
grid and distribute among consumers in various regions in Europe. 
 
The EU energy island issue is closely related to energy security issues. Energy infrastructure is a 
prerequisite to integration of regional energy systems into a bigger European energy system. 
Furthermore, involvement of energy companies into developing strategic infrastructure is 
instrumental for increasing energy security and minimising the “energy island” effect. This 
research is based on analysis of the existing situation regarding energy infrastructure, the role of 
energy companies and energy policy decisions already made both on the EU and national level. 
It includes a focus on steps necessary to overcome energy island isolation. 
 
2. Energy islands – a challenge to a common EU energy policy 
 
Fulfilment of the criteria for calling a territory “an energy island” has multiple implications both 
for the given geographic and / or political entity and the EU as a whole. Those countries, which 
qualify as energy islands, may experience greater dependency on external energy supply. This is 
true for Latvia, which is especially vulnerable given a 100% dependency on Russian natural gas 
supplies and the partial ownership of gas infrastructure by Russia’s Gazprom (together with 
Germany’s E.ON). The de iure and de facto monopoly in the gas sector only adds to the 
uncomfortable position of being an "energy island" because of dependency on Russia for oil and 
gas.1 Estonia has based its energy production mostly on its own fossil energy resource – oil 
shale, generating more than 90% of electricity from it. Until December 2009 Lithuania relied on 
the Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP) to produce most of the needed electricity and managed to 
function as an important balancing source for electricity in the Baltic States. Ignalina NPP had to 
be closed down by January 2009 according to the accession agreement between the EU and 
Lithuania. All three Baltic States receive 100% of their natural gas supplies from the Russian 
Federation with only one route of supply, the only mitigating factor being the presence of an 
underground gas storage facility (UGSF) in Inčukalns in Latvia. Even so, it is important to note 
that the majority shareholder of the UGSF is the Russian natural gas monopolist Gazprom. 
Needless to say that the situation of gas monopoly leaves no place for market mechanisms and 
competition. 
 
                                               
1 BBC News, Guide to Russia's key energy clients, 11 July 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5167062.stm.  
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The energy island situation in the countries of the Iberian Peninsula and especially in the 
Pyrenees is of a slightly different character – it mainly stems from the bottleneck effect of low 
electricity grid transmission capacity across the mountain range separating France and Spain. 
After prolonged efforts to construct a transmission line, a decision was made between French 
and Spanish authorities in June 2008 to proceed with an underground high-voltage direct current 
(HVDC) line. Until that time an over-head wire connection had been under consideration, 
causing significant opposition to the project from local inhabitants and regional authorities, who 
objected to the project’s negative impact on tourism and recreation. This new electricity link is 
slated to begin operations at the end of 2011. This development will partially solve the Pyrenees 
electricity bottleneck problem. It will provide better energy security for the regions on both sides 
of the Pyrenees as well as allow effective use of electricity (via export to the French side) 
produced from renewable energy sources, specifically, the vast capacities of wind farms that 
Spain boasts.2 In a similar way a new electricity interconnection linking Sweden and either 
Latvia or Lithuania would reduce power supply risks in the Baltic States. 
 
These two energy islands have commonalities and differences. In terms of setting policy and 
identifying priorities, identifying commonalities is paramount. The functioning of any energy 
system, be it an energy island or part of a bigger system, takes place in two environments – the 
technical and the political. Lack of transmission lines or pipelines, insufficient grid or pipeline 
capacity contributes to the “islandness” of an energy system. The scale of any energy islands 
energy market may play a role as well, amplifying or decreasing the impact of the system being 
an energy island. A bigger (in terms of the volume of energy produced or consumed) energy 
island may be less vulnerable to external risks than a smaller isolated energy system. 
 
As will later be demonstrated in the sections on specific energy security risks, the most typical 
risks are not equally valid for every situation – their influence on the energy system depends on 
the size, composition and liquidity of the market, availability of local energy resources and other 
factors. While Spain does not have extensive gas pipeline connections with France, this sole fact 
does not mean that the lack of pipelines poses significant risks to the country. However, lack of 
alternative suppliers and supply routes makes Latvia, which is part of the Baltic energy island, 
particularly vulnerable to economic and political pressures from the Russian Federation, which 
can easily employ energy supplies as a political tool.3 Unlike France in its relations vis-à-vis 
Spain and Portugal, the Russian Federation has played and can play out the power card in its 
relations with its neighbours – be it gas price policy, supply volume or other levers of influence 
that can be written off on technicalities of the power industry. 
 
Consensus about the necessity to fix the energy island situation of the Baltic States is quite clear, 
leaders of the Baltic States are repeatedly emphasizing the importance of getting connected. All 
Baltic Sea Region countries have their concerns regarding energy, be it the need to diversify 
energy supply routes, diversify the energy mix or build additional production capacities. The 
Baltic States are concerned about being an “energy island” in the EU.4 The Baltic energy market 
interconnection plan (BEMIP5) was drawn up in 2008 with the assistance of the European 
Commission, which will also be providing its financial share in putting in place wires and cables 
in the Baltic region. 
                                               
2 Peak production of electricity in Spain using wind power reaches more than 50% (Spanish transmission system 
operator (RED) data). 
3 Larsson, Robert, “Nord Stream, Sweden and the Baltic Sea Security”, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008, 
pp.79-81. http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2251.pdf  
4 Rostoks, Toms, “”Energy problem” in the Baltic Sea Rim: is the region pulled together or pulled apart?” in 
„Energy: pulling the Baltic Sea region together or apart?” carried out by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs 
(LIIA), p.146. 
in 2008-2009 with the participation of researchers from nine states of the Baltic Sea Region. 
5 See details at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/bemip_en.htm  
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3. Causes and consequences of the energy island phenomenon 
 
The energy island situation in a given EU region is not something that the region or the countries 
of the region have voluntarily chosen. The island situation stems from geographic position, 
economic and political ties with neighbours and relations with suppliers of power and energy 
resources. 
 
Particular attention should be paid to those energy island countries facing high dependence on a 
single supplier. From this point of view the Baltic energy island situation is worse than the 
Iberian one: the Baltic States are not connected6 with western European or Scandinavian 
electricity networks and they are also heavily dependent7 on Russian natural gas. 
 
From the point of view of European energy integration, the Iberian Peninsula is an energy island, 
because it is effectively isolated from mainland European gas and electricity networks – the 
transmission capacity is rather low and cannot handle large volumes of electricity or gas. This 
isolation aggravates the problem of external energy dependency8 (approx. 80%, well over the EU 
average of approx. 53%) and places Spain as well as Portugal at the level of some Southern 
European (Greece), island (Ireland, Cyprus, Malta) and small (Luxemburg, Belgium) countries 
with no domestic energy resources.9 To compare, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s energy dependency is 
approximately 62% despite 100% reliance on Russian natural gas that is used to produce a 
significant share of electricity and heat.10 Estonia has the lowest energy dependency index 
among the Baltic States – just around 30%, which positions Estonia among the least energy 
dependent EU countries along with Denmark, the UK, Czech Republic and Poland.11 
 
High dependency does not necessarily mean lack of power: Spain's 18700MW of installed wind 
turbine capacity have supplied more than half of its demand forcing the Spanish transmission 
system operator Red Electrica12 to stop wind turbines to keep the system stable at times last 
winter.13 The cause of such obstructionism is the lack of transmission grid connections with a 
broader European market that could be accessed via interconnection with France over the 
Pyrenees Mountains. 
 
3.1. Historical background to energy system development 
 
Certain preconditions determine the development of each specific energy system, be it of local or 
regional character. Geographic position and climate conditions play an important role in how a 
                                               
6 Except for the EstLink 380MW HVDC cable connecting Estonia and Finland. 
7 This is particularly true for Latvia, which produces 30% of its electricity in CHPs from natural gas imported from 
the Russian Federation. Estonia is the least dependent on Russian gas for electricity production, but still uses natural 
gas for district heating like Latvia and Lithuania. 
8 Change and continuity in Spain’s role: from energy island to relevant actor. Esther Barbé (Ed.) Spain in Europe 
2004-2008, Monograph of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy, num. 4, February 2008, Bellaterra 
(Barcelona): Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus. http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-
publicacio/129/t0PJWukerLlvIgPJdtke.PDF 
9 Data source: Eurostat 
10 Around 33% of electricity and over 90% of district heating in Latvia is produced in large CHPs from natural gas. 
Latvian energy in Figures, Ministry of Economics, 2009. 
http://www.em.gov.lv/images/modules/items/les_2009_.pdf  
11 Data source: Eurostat 
12 Red Eléctrica is responsible for the technical management of the Spanish electricity system. As the owner of 99% 
of Spain's high voltage power transmission grid, it is the only company that specializes in the transmission of 
electricity in Spain. 
13 Spain needs electric cars, links for wind boom, by Daniel Fineren, Reuters, 1 March 2010. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6204ND20100301  
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specific energy system is built, in defining the main sectors of energy consumption, the methods 
and resource-use of heat and power production, etc. While Northern Europe consumes heat 
during the colder time of the year, Southern Europe needs cooling throughout most of the year. 
Thus the demand for energy differs in terms of the form of energy, the purpose of use, the 
amount needed, as well as seasonal specifics characteristic for the region. 
 
The environment in which the energy island systems have been developing is also of importance. 
The following two subsections (3.2. and 3.3.) of this policy brief do not relate to the situation in 
the Pyrenees Peninsula, but are important to understand the roots of the Baltic “energy island” 
situation. 
 
3.2. Integrated energy systems operating in EU member countries and third countries 
 
This problem is specific to the Baltic region and is in no way characteristic to Spain and 
Portugal. Larger regional energy systems have been in place in the countries, which used to be 
part of the USSR. Thus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were part of the so-called North-Western 
energy ring encompassing also the North-Western part of Russia and Northern part of Belarus. 
The Baltic energy transmission and balancing system still functions within this larger system, 
which has proved to be reliable and is able to satisfy system requirements even following the 
closure of Ignalina NPP,14 which was an essential element of the system. The North-Western 
energy ring was built in such a way that energy was produced from a variety of sources 
providing good system balancing15 possibilities. If we look at this energy ring then we can see 
that Leningrad (now St.Petersburg) region had an NPP, Moscow region and Belarus had a 
number of high-capacity combined heat and power stations,16 Lithuania had Ignalina NPP, 
Latvia had a cascade of hydroelectric power stations and Estonia – oil-shale power stations. 
 
The two energy island cases have diverse historical backgrounds. In the case of the Baltic States 
the isolation from the rest of the EU stems from the integration into the former energy system of 
the North-Western part of the former USSR. The Baltic States are “energy islands “ in their new 
family - the EU, but are well connected with their ‘’old’’ family, i.e. with Lithuania, Estonia, the 
Russian Federation and Belarus, which are all parties in the organisation called BRELL17 uniting 
TSOs of the respective countries. Each country TSO in rotation coordinates the functioning of 
BRELL. 
 
Unlike the Baltic States, Spain and Portugal have never been incorporated into some other 
energy system outside the EU and their geographic positioning allows for solutions other than 
over-the-head (OH) lines, cables and pipelines. 
 
3.3. Lack of incentive to reorient towards developing stronger links with the rest of EU 
 
The fairly good heritage from the Soviet era in terms of energy transmission infrastructure has so 
far provided little incentive to reorient the Baltic energy system towards its EU partners while 
still keeping in place the existing interconnections with the partners in the former North-Western 
energy ring that has been replaced by BRELL after the break-up of the USSR. Nevertheless 
Baltic transmission system operators (TSOs) are planning to join the Union for the Co-ordination 
                                               
14 Ignalina NPP that had 2720MW (2x1360MW) capacity had to be closed down by the end of 2009 according to the 
accession agreement between the EU and Lithuania based on operational security concerns of RBMK-1500 type 
reactors expressed by the EU while referring to the use of the same kind of reactors in Chernobyl NPP.  
15 Balancing is necessary in almost every energy system during moments when one or more power producing 
entities stops for whatever reason. Other permanently available power production or electricity import capacities 
have to be in place to compensate loss of capacity in the system. 
16 Combined heat and power or cogeneration power plants – produce both heat and electricity simultaneously. 
17 See details (in Russian) at http://www.so-ups.ru/index.php?id=brell  
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of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) system sometime in the future notwithstanding the lack of 
immediate technical necessity to switch over to the wider European system. System operators, 
however, would have to achieve higher electricity quality standards before joining the UCTE 
system. Besides that, the Baltic States would like to become active members of the Scandinavian 
NORDEL18 system and trade electricity on the Nordpool Spot market. NORDEL and UCTE 
joined ENTSO-E,19 the union of electricity system operators in 2009 to improve coordination of 
power transmission. Thus the main reason for joining the UCTE system would be integration of 
the Baltic energy systems into a wider European energy system and hence also energy market. 
 
3.4. The role of energy companies as partners instrumental to achieve higher energy 
security 
 
Energy production, transmission and distribution companies are key players in any energy 
system. Thus the development of energy systems to a large extent depends on the companies’ 
willingness to take part in developing new interconnections, which includes having the ability to 
finance infrastructure projects, as well as the ability to cooperate with authorities that make 
political decisions. 
 
The EU has a crucial role in these processes. The EU has developed a number of instruments that 
facilitate decision-making processes in the member states both in terms of policy-making and 
planning investment in energy infrastructure. Trans-European Networks for electricity and gas 
along with such initiatives as the Electricity Regional Initiative and Gas Regional Initiative 
provide good and realistic grounds for improvement in electricity grid and gas pipeline network 
development with emphasis on those regions that are least connected.  
 
The Baltic and Iberian energy islands certainly qualify to benefit from these initiatives, albeit for 
slightly varying reasons. The main concern of the Baltic Transmission system operators (TSO) is 
to connect to the wider European electricity network because of poor connectivity with the 
Nordic and western European power markets and risks stemming from lack of power production 
capacity. TSOs in the South-Western part of Europe are going to play an important role in 
improving interconnectivity of the Iberian Peninsula in particular and the rest of Europe with 
potentially very lucrative green energy production possibilities on the African continent. One 
such example is the prospect of connecting France and Morocco via Spain to harness solar 
energy produced in North Africa.20 
 
4. Energy island phenomenon and its relation to energy security risks 
 
The energy island situation is inherently related to energy security risks. In the Pyrenees the risks 
are related to insufficient capacity of electricity interconnections with France, thus making it 
more complicated for the Spanish TSO RED Electrica to carry out balancing system tasks – 
Spain easily produces at least 25% of its electricity in wind farms, but the peak production may 
rise to well over half of electricity produced in Spain. Therefore, the main problem is 
overproduction of power that needs to be balanced and exported. 
 
In the Baltic States the risks are related to a number of issues, starting with an extreme 
dependency on Russian natural gas and ending with a lack of sufficient electricity transmission 
                                               
18 NORDEL, Association of the TSOs in Northern Europe. 
19 ENTSO-E, European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. 
20 The Mediterranean Solar Plan: Implementation status and Links with EU policy, Direction Générale de l'Energie 
et du Climat (DGEC) Ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Energie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer (MEEDDM), 
2009, pp.18-26. http://www.estelasolar.eu/fileadmin/ESTELAdocs/documents/Workshop_08/2010-07-15_-_MSP_-
_Pierre_Convert.pdf 
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capacity within the region and lack of interconnections with other countries of the EU. Thus the 
risks of energy shortages are present although no massive blackouts have been experienced. 
Lack of intra-region transmission capacity makes local energy regions vulnerable to power cuts 
stemming from environmental and meteorological causes.  
 
4.1. Integration into the former system and isolation from the rest of the EU 
 
As noted above the Baltic States have for a long time been integrated into the former energy 
system of the North-Western part of the former USSR and this situation makes them remain 
energy islands within the EU. The situation is different in Spain and Portugal. 
 
Fostering free and fair competition has helped to develop the energy market. Initiatives of some 
of the energy market players in Europe did spark contradicting reactions in 2006 when E.ON got 
permission from the EU antitrust regulator to take over Spanish ENDESA, despite concerns that 
this merger might jeopardise the functioning of the free market, especially in Spain and Portugal. 
It is important to mention in the context of the “energy island” issue, that the EU’s competition 
commissioner Neelie Kroes noted at the time that the parties involved in the market investigation 
have pointed out the Spanish market being an “energy island” due to the low interconnection 
capacity with neighbouring countries (in particular, France), and also operational and regulatory 
barriers. Therefore, the possibility for E.ON to import electricity into Spain, which was one of 
the major points of concern for the Spanish side, was very limited.21 This demonstrates that both 
the companies and the Commission have been and still are aware of the nature of difficulties for 
a common energy market. 
 
4.2. Repercussions in a national security context 
 
The “energy island” situation has implications for the national security of the countries 
concerned. Implications differ in the two cases under review: Spain and Portugal do not 
experience the presence of third-country energy companies, while third-country energy 
companies are present in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
The main problems the Iberian countries have to handle are mostly of technical and economic 
character although opposition of local authorities to OH lines in the Pyrenees can be considered 
to have a political tone. The Baltic States, however, not only have to deal with technical issues, 
like production capacity and intra-regional power transmission capacity, but also have to keep in 
mind the role of their partners in the East, namely Russia, whose presence in the Baltic energy 
system is strong and cemented with, for example, exclusive rights in the natural gas market22 at 
least until year 2014. 
 
The above conditions add a strong political dimension to Baltic-Russian energy relations. The 
dominant position in the energy market makes this provider of energy resources powerful when 
negotiating energy prices. The area where Russia has clearly demonstrated that energy can 
effectively be used as a policy tool vis-à-vis the Baltic States is supply and transit of oil 
                                               
21 Case No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / ENDESA, Notification of 16.03.2006 pursuant to Article 4 of Council 
Regulation No 139/2004, 25 April 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4110_20060425_20310_en.pdf;  
E.ON Backs Away From Endesa, Forbes.com, 03 April 2007. http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/03/eon-endesa-enel-
markets-equity-cx_cn_markets16.html 
22 Latvia’s Parliament prolonged the right to legal monopoly of JSC Latvijas gāze (Gas of Latvia) till March 2014. 
In addition to this, the privatisation deal of JSC Latvijas gāze between the state and the shareholders provides 
exclusive rights of operation of the company in Latvia till 2017 and attempts to liberalise natural gas market may 
result in court proceedings and compensation payments to the company from the state budget. 
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products,23 negotiating gas prices has always proved difficult. Russia has used gas prices as 
leverage in its relations and foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarus and Ukraine.  
 
Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool has taken various forms: total or partial supply 
interruptions, threats of supply interruptions, pricing policy, use of existing energy debts, 
creating new energy debts, hostile take-over of energy companies or infrastructure. To illustrate 
the scale and potential of risks stemming from geographic positioning – it has been estimated 
that there have been more than 50 incidents24 of one or another kind from 1991 (break-up of the 
USSR) till 2007 in energy relations between Russia and consumers of its energy resources. Only 
20% of the incidents had no political underpinning.25 
 
Considering the above the following three subsections on energy security risks cover the Baltic 
energy island situation rather than the Iberian one. 
 
4.2.1. Dependency on one supplier 
 
This risk is characteristic to the Baltic region because of its historical links with the energy 
system of the countries of the former USSR, namely, Russia, which, as already indicated, is the 
sole supplier of natural gas and also the largest shareholder of the gas transmission, storage and 
distribution network. The situation is slightly different with respect to electricity – each of the 
Baltic States produces their electricity in their own particular way. Estonia produces over 90% of 
electricity from its own oil-shale. One third of electricity in Latvia comes from three 
hydroelectric power stations (HPS) on the River Daugava and another 30% is produced by 
burning natural gas in two combined heat and power stations.26 Over 80% of electricity needed 
in Lithuania used to be produced by the Ignalina nuclear power plant, but after its closure most 
electricity comes from upgraded CHPs that played only a marginal role while Ignalina NPP was 
in operation. The significance of natural gas in the lives of ordinary citizens is felt every time the 
gas monopolist raises or talks about raising gas prices – households that organised their 
infrastructure around gas (cooking, heating, water heating) as the main source of energy when 
gas prices were low and gas technologies for households were subsidized by the monopolist, are 
the first to feel the effect of price changes. 
 
4.2.2. Dependency on one major energy resource 
 
Spain and Portugal do not experience particular dependency on one specific energy resource. A 
significant share of electricity produced from wind power could be called another form of 
dependency since wind power needs balancing and balancing requires the ability to put in 
operation permanently available energy production facilities. It is interesting to note that big 
energy companies see wind energy as the best niche for investment purely from the commercial 
point of view even if compared to natural gas,27 which has highest efficiency among fossil fuels 
and which is also most environmentally friendly among fossil fuels. 
 
Renewable energy might be an answer to the dependency of the Baltic States on Russian gas, but 
there are also difficulties to be overcome if wind power is to be considered as the best solution 
                                               
23 Russia stopped oil flow through the Druzhba pipeline to Mazeikiai Oil Refinery since July 2006 after Lithuania 
sold it to Polish PKN Orlen instead of Rosneft, which was one of the bidders. 
24 Larsson, Robert, “Nord Stream, Sweden and the Baltic Sea Security”, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008, 
pp.79-80 and p.82. http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2251.pdf 
25 Ibid, pp. 81.  
26 Riga TEC-1 and TEC-2 CHPs. 
27 Ana Maria Fernandes, CEO EDP Renovaveis, EDP Investor day, 6 November 2008, p.75. 
http://www.edp.pt/en/Investidores/publicacoes/apresentacoes/Presentations%202008/Investor%20Day%20-
%20November%202008.pdf  
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for electricity production from renewable energy sources (RES). One such difficulty is of purely 
technical character – the transmission grid28 would currently not be able to absorb the power that 
could be fed into the grid from off-shore wind-farms in Latvia, which is also trying to solve 
legislative loopholes to open up the wind energy business off the coast. Electricity production 
from biomass is an option, the only problem being the amount of heat produced in cogeneration 
power plants while producing electricity – it is the amount of heat consumed in summer time that 
is the point of reference when planning capacity of a new biomass CHP. Lithuania has relatively 
low wind power potential, but is keen to develop power production from biogas.  
 
Estonia is in a different position owing to its geography – Estonian islands offer an excellent 
place for wind power development. Estonia currently has 150MW of installed onshore wind 
energy generation capacity and a further 375MW due to become operational in 2013. To achieve 
its wind power target for 2018 a further 400MW are to be installed onshore and 500MW off the 
coast.29 Theoretically Estonia could cover most of its electricity demand by wind. The only issue 
remaining is accumulation and balancing power plants that should be built in parallel to keep the 
system stable. 
 
4.2.3. Dependency on one supply route 
 
Besides dependency on one specific and important energy resource, the Baltic States and 
especially Latvia are also subject to another risk:  all natural gas supplies come through only one 
supply route. Building an LNG (gasification) terminal in one of the Baltic States would be an 
option for diversification of supply routes. European Parliament has been keen in keeping 
security of energy supply high on the agenda through encouraging and supporting the 
construction of LNG terminals, notably in countries most vulnerable to disruptions of gas 
supply.30 However, LNG import as a risk mitigation step is valid only if it breaks the current 
monopoly of control from Russian gas suppliers. Itera Latvija gas company, which is a daughter 
company of Russia’s Itera and is also shareholder at JSC Latvijas gāze has on occasion voiced 
suggestions of building a LNG terminal in Latvia, thus discrediting the whole idea of LNG as a 
solution to the present energy security risks of dependency on one energy resource, one supplier 
and one supply route.  
 
The risk of a single energy supply route also is also valid in situations where there are energy 
production capacities, but interconnections are insufficient for transmitting the power to the parts 
of energy system that need energy. The situation with interconnections between Spain and 
France is an example of this. 
 
4.2.4. Increasing consumption of energy 
 
The Baltic States are not among the countries with the highest energy consumption per capita in 
Europe. Latvia and Lithuania consume about half of the EU average per capita.  Estonia has 
comfortably reached the EU average indicators.31 Total energy consumption is, therefore, not 
high. The potential for increased consumption of energy is one of the factors that need to be 
examined in a long-term perspective and through a sustainability and green growth prism. To 
cite a truism of the field:  “The best energy is energy that has not been used”. Energy 
                                               
28 The so called Kurzeme electricity ring that is an unaccomplished task yet will receive financial support as part of 
the BEMIP initiative. Wind energy production cannot be carried out without upgrading the grid capacity. 
29 Gaizauskas, Vytautas, Kicking the gas habit: Offshore wind for the Baltic states, Wind Energy Update, 11 June 
2010. http://social.windenergyupdate.com/industry-insight/kicking-gas-habit-offshore-wind-baltic-states  
30 European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, Draft report on Towards a New Energy 
Strategy for Europe 2011-2020, (2010/2108(INI)), para. 40. Available on-line at http://bit.ly/bNDVeO  
31 Latvian energy in Figures, Ministry of Economics, 2009, p.6. 
http://www.em.gov.lv/images/modules/items/les_2009_.pdf  
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consumption per capita in Spain is slightly below the EU average, but is definitely higher than in 
Latvia and Lithuania. The general rule is that energy consumption follows GDP growth, and the 
wealthier a country is the more energy is consumed by single person.32 Increasing energy 
consumption leads to a need to produce more energy or to increase electricity import either from 
other EU countries or third-countries. In the Iberian case, the lack of power is not typical. In the 
Baltic States, however, Estonia is virtually self-sufficient, while Latvia has to import about one 
third of electricity needed. 
 
There are two ways how the impact of energy consumption on energy security risks can be 
mitigated – via tax and price policy or the improvement of energy efficiency. When energy 
imports are increasing due to a lack of domestic production capacity,33 a more efficient use of 
energy, whether produced or imported, is a potential solution. Higher energy efficiency standards 
in the construction industry and raising awareness among consumers and households is a 
significant part of the answer to the increasing demand problem. The recent economic crisis has 
paradoxically also contributed to energy savings efforts, making energy consumption drop back 
to pre-crisis levels (both on the EU and national level). Energy consumption growth forecasts 
have also been revised by those responsible for planning the future demand and supply balance. 
 
4.2.5. Limited or no energy market 
 
In contradiction to the experience of prying open the electricity market in the Baltic States, Spain 
has become the most liberalised energy market in continental Europe since the country’s energy 
supply and consumer market was opened up to external players in 2000, offering opportunities to 
new entrants with innovative supply solutions.34 Although Spain has a number of strong players 
that were able to unite against Germany’s E.ON when it tried to take over ENDESA in 2006 and 
2007, the domestic market is functioning and competition is present. 
 
Unlike in the Pyrenees, the situation in the Baltic States is indeed typical of a limited energy 
market. Although the electricity market was finally opened in 2010 also by Estonia and 
Lithuania,35 it can hardly be called a free and functioning electricity market. Energy producing 
incumbents36 retain the dominant position in each of the three countries and the dynamics of 
change is slow. New players are entering the market slowly and face serious competition in the 
form of defensive tactics by the incumbents. 
 
The situation is different when it comes to natural and liquefied gas. While gas supplies, storage 
and distribution in the Baltic States belong to a monopoly, market liberalisation in the Iberian 
Peninsula has facilitated growth37 of the natural gas business. The domestic companies in the 
Iberian market have a number of competing external market players (REN Atlantico, Transgas, 
Naturgas, EDP Gas, HC Energia) with a clear set of rules.  
 
The gas lobby is very strong and has achieved favourable conditions for penetrating markets in 
some member states. Good indication of interests of [Russian] gas industry was revealed on a 
number of occasions, negotiations on derogations from the Energy Tax Directive being just one 
                                               
32 Latvian energy in Figures, Ministry of Economics, 2009, p.6. 
http://www.em.gov.lv/images/modules/items/les_2009_.pdf, also Eurostat statistics on energy and GDP. 
33 As opposite to imports because of lower energy price in the market. 
34 Iberian energizer, Frontiers, British Petroleum, August 2004, pp.16-21. 
35 Latvia opened its electricity market on 1 July 2007. 
36 National energy production enterprises Latvenergo in Latvia, Lietuvos energijas in Lithuania and Eesti Energia in 
Estonia. 
37 EDP Financial Report 2008, pp.19-21. 
http://www.edp.pt/en/Investidores/publicacoes/relatorioecontas/2008/Annual%20Report%202008/Financial%20Rep
ort%202008.pdf 
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example. During the negotiations some delegations requested derogations for member states that 
effectively are energy islands.38 
 
The idea of gas market liberalisation in those EU countries that have chosen to apply derogations 
provided for in the Energy Tax Directive39 is also driven by EU’s striving for improved 
competition policies and conditions in the member states. The main idea behind gas market 
liberalisation incentives is improvement of energy security of member states. A free EU gas 
market will decrease the risks that stem from dependency of a number of member states on 
Russian natural gas. “Gas wars” in recent years demonstrated possible effects of supply 
disruptions.  
 
The problem with having a monopoly is that such a situation has a very high potential to make 
all the classic risks – dependence on one energy resource, supplier and supply route – come true 
in a worst-case scenario. A recent study by the European Centre for International Political 
Economy (ECIPE) emphasizes that particular attention should be paid to the countries that need 
antitrust action most, namely Bulgaria, the Baltic States, and Slovakia.40 This is important 
because a lot of attention by the European competition bodies has been paid to fighting unfair 
market practices in Western European countries in recent years. The recent antitrust cases have 
focused on those markets that are least vulnerable to supply cuts from Russia’s Gazprom, 
although Gazprom has clearly been behind most recent gas supply disruptions to European 
countries.  
 
5. Avoiding and connecting energy islands in the EU 
 
Generally it can be said that there are two types of challenges for any energy island – technical 
and political, where the political encompasses also economic aspects. A common and effectively 
functioning energy market in the EU can be both the ends and the means of solving the energy 
island situation that a number of EU member states are in. Iberian (IEI) and Baltic energy islands 
(BEI) demonstrate that energy islands have elements that are in common and that there are also 
elements that are unique to each specific situation. The Iberian energy island is more of a 
technical issue while the Baltic energy island has more political and economic elements 
overlaying the technical situation it is in.  
 
Common to both situations is insufficient power transmitting capacity, lack of transmission lines 
and gas pipelines. No wires and pipelines means no market. However, having wires and 
pipelines does not yet mean a free market – a single market participant or few market players can 
be an indication of low market liquidity, which means that the market will not function 
effectively. 
 
Differences come into play when we look at what implications technical and market aspects 
bring in. The Iberian energy island has fairly well functioning liberalised electricity and gas 
market with several important players that are able to compete with each other according to 
clearly set rules. The Baltic energy has few players on the electricity market and just one player 
on the gas market where a monopoly exists both de jure and de facto. While putting in place 
                                               
38 Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply 
and repealing Directive 2004/67/CE – Progress Report, para. 15. 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16000.en09.pdf.  
39 Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of 
energy products and electricity. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:EN:PDF  
40 Iana Dreyer, Fredrik Erixon, and Robin Winkler, The Quest for Gas Market Competition Fighting Europe’s 
Dependency on Russian Gas more Effectively, ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 1/2010. 
http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-occasional-papers/the-quest-for-gas-market-competition/PDF  
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more power interconnections with the rest of the EU might make the day for the participants of 
electricity market, strategic gas pipelines are likely to maintain status quo. Considering that the 
existing pipelines come from one single source and supplier, LNG regasification seems to be the 
only feasible option for opening up gas market in the Baltic States provided that third-party 
access to pipelines is granted. 
 
5.1. Technical challenges 
 
As noted above, availability of local renewable energy sources may compensate for the lack of 
import / export capacity, but it does not necessarily mean a complete solution for the functioning 
of the market. One of the problems is balancing capacity either through permanently available 
energy production facilities or through electricity import. The Iberian Peninsula is an energy 
island given the lack of interconnections with France. The high variability in electricity 
production from renewable energy sources means that countries, which have significant wind 
power capacity – and Spain is such a country – have already surpassed, during high winds, 50% 
coverage of national demand in an instant or 40% of national demand over a whole day. On the 
other hand there are hours or even days when wind energy production does not reach 2% of 
national demand. The average production capacity of national electricity demand was 13% in 
2009.41 Volatile production capacity means practical challenges to the TSOs that have to find 
ways to get the balancing power where and when needed. 
 
The Spanish energy island has one important issue with a technical origin – the Spanish market 
cannot consume all the power produced from RES during peak production hours. Lack of 
interconnection capacity means that Spain cannot export the surplus either.42 Spain’s installed 
wind power capacity exceeds 18700MW43, which makes it one of the leaders in wind power 
energy production worldwide. 
 
Over recent years, three special projects were undertaken, which are due to be commissioned in 
the period from 2011 till 2014. The first one to be implemented is a new interconnection with 
France, which is classified as of high-priority interest by the European Union. This 
interconnection will allow the present interconnection capacity between both countries to be 
doubled.44 Two more links with Portugal are expected to come into service by 2012, increasing 
the ability of the Iberian power system to cope with variable wind power output.45 
 
There are also gas interconnections planned between Spain and France. The development of gas 
interconnections with Spain is the priority of work conducted by the ERGEG South Gas 
Regional Initiative. The project is set to improve the security of supply for France and the Iberian 
                                               
41 José Luis Molina, The challenge of integrating renewable energy in Spain, May 28, 2010. 
http://www.telvent.es/en/business_areas/global_services/blogs/2010/the-challenge-of-integrating-renewable-energy-
in-spain.cfm. 
42 Jose Manuel Tarifa Calvet, Meda Enviro Network, The Energy Market in Spain, Promotion of a Network of Euro-
Mediterranean Enterprises in the Alternative Energy Source Sector, 4 November 2009. 
http://www.medenergy.org/pres/Inv_ASEM_MedenergyPresent_MedaEnviro_Tarifa_v1E_1109.pdf.  
43 Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC). Global Wind 2007 Report. 
http://www.technologyreview.com/microsites/spain/wind/  
44 “Grid congestion a breeze for Spanish wind energy generators”, Miguel de la Torre, senior engineer at Red 
Eléctrica de España, Spain’s grid transmission operator, in Wind Energy Update, 25 March 2010. 
http://social.windenergyupdate.com/qa/grid-congestion-breeze-spanish-wind-energy-generators.  
45 Spain needs electric cars, links for wind boom, by Daniel Fineren, Reuters, 1 March 2010. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6204ND20100301 
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Peninsula and to develop the French gas market in the southern part of the country.46 The 
development plan is coordinated by the French and Spanish TSOs. 
 
As for the Baltic region the main source of activity and co-funding is the BEMIP, which lists 
specific tasks to be carried out and envisages EU funding. Without doubt the main activities are 
putting in place at least two electricity interconnections from the Baltic States – one that would 
link the Baltic energy system with Sweden and another one linking Lithuania and Poland. 
 
5.2. Political challenges 
 
There are several challenges of political nature arising from the energy island situation. In both 
the Iberian energy island and the Baltic energy island situation support of the government and 
the parliament is essential to facilitate further development of a common European energy 
market for electricity and for gas. While even Spanish protectionism vis-à-vis its own market 
participants be it power or gas has not hampered the opening up of power and gas markets, 
political decisions in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia, have followed the interests of energy 
sector lobbyists favouring maintenance of the status quo with respect to market conditions or 
have even tried to capture the market before its full opening.47  
 
At the same time initiatives supporting market development have been put in place by the EU, 
namely electricity and gas regional initiatives (ERI and GRI respectively48) created by the 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), aim to identify and implement 
practical solutions to overcome barriers to trade and facilitate regional market integration.49 
These regional initiatives are of both technical and political character, but would not be able to 
function without due political support of the involved parties and market participants.  
 
In the case of the Iberian energy island there is yet another policy level that is involved and 
cannot be by-passed – local municipalities and inhabitants have a strong say in decision-making 
concerning new transmission lines across the Pyrenees. Public opposition to new electricity lines 
across the Pyrenees and a lack of French support for the proposals has led to a result that 
transmission capacity between France and Spain remains unchanged since 1982. The first new 
grid connection between France and Spain in nearly three decades is due to be built and will 
double the existing transmission capacity.50 Such a development became possible after an 
agreement was reached with the local authorities that part of the electricity line will be crossing 
the Pyrenees as an underground cable, thus leaving the looks of the surrounding environment 
unchanged. 
 
                                               
46 Deliberation of the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) dated 29 April 2010 providing 
guidelines/guidance on the development of gas interconnections with Spain as part of the Open Season 2015 
procedure. http://bit.ly/c5F0SW  
47 This reference is made specifically in respect of the lobbying activities of the Russian and German-owned gas 
company JSC Latvijas gāze, which is the sole supplier of natural gas to the Baltic States. Latvian Parliament 
extended the period of exclusive rights in the market to the incumbent company till spring 2014 through a vote on 3 
December 2009 when the term was closing in (the local gas market would otherwise have to be opened for 
competition starting from January 2010). 
48 South-West ERI covers the electricity markets of France, Spain and Portugal; Baltic ERI covers Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. South GRI covers the gas markets of France, Spain and Portugal. GRI does not cover the Baltic 
States. 
49 ERGEG Regional Initiatives Factsheet, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_INITIATIVES/Progress_Reports/2007/RI_Annual_Reports/ER
GEG_Regional_Initiatives_Factsheet_0.pdf  
50 Spain proposes doubling of renewable energy capacity, Rachel Fielding, BusinessGreen, 2 Mar 2010. 
http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2258758/spain-proposes-doubling  
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There is a fairly good consensus in the Baltic States about the necessity to build interconnections 
with other EU member states. There is weaker consensus, however, about what kind of power 
production capacities would be the best option to cover local electricity demand. Politicians 
express their support for new transmission lines and also new production capacity initiatives,51 
especially those, which can be considered as regional Baltic projects, for example, Visaginas 
nuclear power plant52 replacing53 Ignalina NPP. The growing threat to Lithuania’s energy 
security following the closure of Ignalina NPP54 at the end of 2009 has been taken very 
seriously.55 The European Commission with close assistance from the EU’s Swedish presidency 
drafted the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,56 its Action Plan providing for activities in the 
field of energy. The Strategy stipulates that the Baltic Sea Region has the potential to be a model 
region in combating climate change. In addition to the scope for developing renewable energies 
(mentioned in a separate section), there is room for improvement in the energy efficiency of 
residential buildings, district heating (system for distributing heat generated in a centralised 
location for residential and commercial buildings) and combined heat and power facilities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
As long as EU regions do not have a better developed and interconnected electricity and gas 
infrastructure, some of the regions will remain either isolated from or ineffective in the common 
EU energy market. Member states stuck in an energy island situation will be looking for energy 
solutions parallel to seeking long-term development of interconnections with a wider EU energy 
system. This may include remaining well integrated in existing energy systems with third 
countries, which is the case for the Baltic States, or having energy production capacities that 
cannot be exported, which is the Iberian case. Import of natural gas with no supply alternatives 
may have an adverse effect on national policies of the Baltic energy islands. Import of energy for 
either market or renewable energy sources balancing needs is hampered in the Iberian energy 
island case. 
 
EU member states still have polarised views on energy policy supported by different national 
interests. This can be observed especially well in the Baltic States, which have no alternatives for 
getting a vital energy resource, natural gas, into their cogeneration power plants. Baltic attitudes 
towards the Russian Federation in combination with energy isolation from Western European 
energy infrastructure endanger energy security of the Baltic region.57 As was indicated earlier in 
the paper, Russia is not shy in pursuing its interests via the energy lever. Energy security remains 
high on the political agenda of the EU as an organisation and of individual member states.58 
                                               
51 EUP debate on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (recast) (COM(2008)0229 C6-0184/2008 – 
2008/0090(COD)), available on-line http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+CRE+20090310+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN, p.29, 10 March 2009. 
52 The intended capacity of Visaginas NPP might be up to 3400MW. “New Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant Project 
in Lithuania moves forward”.  
 http://www.euronuclear.org/e-news/e-news-22/Visaginas_NPP%20.htm  
53 Environmental Impact Analysis has been carried out already and Lithuania is keen to proceed. For details, see 
http://www.vae.lt/en/articles/view/108 and http://www.vae.lt/en/pages/takeover-of-ignalina-npp-infrastructure  
54 For details on the decommissioning of Ignalina NPP see the official site of INPP: 
http://www.iae.lt/default_en.asp?lang=1&subsub=10001  
55 President calls for further development of energy projects and higher energy security in the region. 
http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/9120, 23 May 2008. 
56 EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: 
http://www.raplm.gov.lv/uploads/filedir/ES/teritoriala_sadarb/Minipanorama_strategy_en.pdf  
57 Gaidžiūnaite, Lina. Energetinis saugumas ir NATO vaidmuo Baltijos šalyse. Energy security and the role of 
NATO in the Baltic States. 2009. 
58 Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Audronis Azubalis, in The Lithuania Tribune, GlobalPost, August 24, 
2010. 
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However, bilateral energy relations of member states with the suppliers of energy resources from 
third countries send confusing signals to those who believe the EU should have a common 
energy market and a common energy policy both within the EU as well as in foreign economic 
relations. 
 
Regions excluded from the common European energy market are trying to solve their specific 
local energy issues and while following the general requirements of the EU energy law, they still 
find themselves under the influence of third-country energy supply (the Baltic States) or unable 
to diversify their energy mix (the Baltic States) or further develop their specific energy potential 
(both the Baltic and the Iberian example). It is important that the EU institutions influence 
effectively the way member states handle their relationships with energy companies, 
transmission system operators (TSOs) and how national regulators exercise their role as energy 
market watchdogs and facilitate less seclusion of regional energy systems from the rest of the 
EU.  
 
The EU is aware of the necessity to tackle those situations in the EU, which are posing risks to 
energy security in individual member states, particular regions and in the EU as a whole. This 
awareness must be translated into more substantial and more timely actions, and include the 
disposal of sufficient funds for this purpose. External energy relations will remain a prerogative 
of individual member states for some time to come, however, it does not mean that exercising 
more pressure on national governments and energy companies should be an extraordinary 
practice. Establishing energy production and transmission infrastructure cannot happen without 
the direct involvement of energy companies and the support of parliaments, governments, local 
authorities and even citizens. Proper infrastructure planning and timely dialogue with businesses, 
municipalities and citizens must be an essential part of energy infrastructure development. 
 
An enhanced role for national energy regulators and the European group of energy regulators 
(ERGEG) may be part of the solution for minimising the energy island effect. Regulators could 
also serve to resolve situations and practices that are slowing down or even working against the 
development of common energy market through exploiting all possible derogations from EU 
law. Such a situation can be positively influenced through tighter competition rules and practice. 
 
Last, but not least – the EU’s common foreign and security policy needs to get more energised 
thus overcoming the unfortunately commonplace split between traditional foreign and security 
relations and economic issues. This includes putting in place technical solutions to avoid energy 
islands. There is no obvious argument why EU members should continue to pursue bilateral 
external energy relations, hindering the possibility to develop a common European energy 
policy. A stronger Europe would emerge if in energy policy the EU were to use its ability to 
protect the common interests of its members with a single voice. It should be kept in mind that 
the ultimate goal of the European Union’s energy law and practice is minimising energy security 
risks and fostering a common European energy market. 
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7. Recommendations 
 
Energy island situations in the EU require solutions, which may seem simple on the surface, but 
may require a complicated set of actions on various levels. Putting in place a cable or a pipeline 
may seem easily implementable from technical perspective, but may require serious domestic, 
regional and inter-regional or international decision-making and political support. Given the 
character and technical and political aspects of the given energy islands, the following 
recommendations also summarised in the table below can be drawn for the particular two 
situations as well as any other similar situation: 
 
 Regional plans for development of energy infrastructure can be drawn up repeating the Baltic 
energy market interconnection plan (BEMIP) pattern; 
 Levels of action (intra- and interregional, and EU) and policy areas (energy, foreign and 
security) have to be as closely interacting as possible; 
 National governments should be stimulated to invest in inter-regional interconnections or 
provide political support for the development of infrastructure that minimises energy security 
risks; 
 Competition regulations should be further elaborated to grant national regulators power to 
effectively implement free market requirements; 
 Third-party access to networks should be ensured to guarantee increasing market liquidity. 
 
Recommended behaviour and action: Levels of action and overlapping policy areas 
 
  Level of action 
  Intra-regional Inter-regional EU 
P
ol
ic
y 
ar
ea
 
Energy 
policy 
 
 Putting in place 
infrastructure to 
strengthen national 
energy system and 
its separate sections 
 Upgrading grid 
capacity to allow 
renewable power to 
be fed into grids 
 Ensuring third party 
access to gas 
transmission 
pipelines 
 Putting in place 
reverse flow option 
for gas pipelines 
 Diversification of 
supply infrastructure 
to minimise one-
route supply risks 
 
 Planning and putting 
in place gas and 
power 
interconnections 
between regions 
 Upgrading of 
infrastructure 
capacity for power 
balancing (especially 
the power produced 
from RES) and 
security of supply 
 Diversifying 
regional power 
generation (energy 
mix) and supply of 
energy resources 
 
 Exercising a 
common approach 
to similar situations 
in external relations 
(vis-à-vis third 
countries) 
 Timely planning of 
strategic 
infrastructure that is 
crucial for energy 
security 
 Ensuring third-party 
access in all member 
states with special 
attention to energy 
islands 
 Implementing 
effective anti-trust 
policy including 
with the help of 
energy regulators 
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Foreign 
policy 
 
 Implementing bi- 
and multilateral 
relations with 
neighbours to 
develop regional 
markets 
 Implementing bi- 
and multilateral 
relations with 
neighbours 
supporting 
development of 
strategic energy 
infrastructure 
 
 
 Drawing up bilateral 
and multilateral 
cooperation 
agreements to 
support strategic 
regional energy 
interests in line with 
the EU strategic 
interests 
 
 Developing and 
strengthening 
common and 
coordinated external 
relations on strategic 
energy interests of 
the EU 
Security 
policy 
 
 Putting in place 
back-up capacities 
for strategic 
infrastructure 
 
 Developing 
cooperation on 
regional security 
issues related to 
energy and 
economic security 
 
 
 Developing and 
strengthening 
common external 
relations on 
strategically 
important energy 
security issues 
 
 
